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1. Introduction
Wireless multi-user MIMO communications are used more and more often to exchange
sensitive data. Because of the broadcast nature of the physical medium, unauthorized
receivers located within the transmission range can observe the signals sent by the transmitter
to a legitimate receiver and eavesdrop them. Therefore, security has become an extremely
important issue to deal with. Multiuser MIMO communications are particularly sensitive to
the problem of security, because each confidential message must be kept secret not only from
external nodes, but also from all the users other than the intended one.
Traditionally, wireless security is ensured by network-layer cryptography techniques.
However, these techniques may not be suitable in the case of large dynamic wireless
networks, since they raise issues like key distribution and management (for symmetric
cryptosystems), and high computational complexity (for asymmetric cryptosystems).
Moreover, these schemes are potentially vulnerable, since they rely on the limited resources
of the eavesdropper and on the unproven assumption that certain encryption algorithms are
hard to invert. Methods exploiting the randomness inherent in noisy channels, known as
physical layer security, have been proposed to enhance the protection of transmitted data
and achieve perfect secrecy [1, 2]. Physical-layer security allows secret communications over
a wireless channel without requiring an encryption key, and it works by limiting the amount
of information that can be extracted at the physical level by an unintended receiver. This is
performed by designing appropriate coding and precoding schemes, and by exploiting the
channel state information available at the network nodes [3].
Physical layer security for communications was proposed in the 1970’s by Wyner [4], who
studied a three-terminal network consisting of a transmitter, an intended user and an
eavesdropper, known as the wiretap channel. For this network, the secrecy capacity was
defined as the maximum rate at which a message can be transmitted reliably to the intended
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user while the rate of information leakage to the eavesdropper vanishes asymptotically with
the code length. For the case when the eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of
the intended user’s channel, Wyner showed that it is possible to have secret communication
without using an encryption key. This can be achieved by a randomized coding scheme
where the information is hidden in the additional noise seen by the eavesdropper. Each
message is mapped to many codewords, thus inducing maximal equivocation at the
eavesdropper. Csizar and Korner generalized Wyner’s work by considering a nondegraded
version of the wiretap channel [5].
Physical layer security was then applied to Gaussian channels [6], and it was observed that
a secret transmission can be achieved only if the channel at the eavesdropper is noisier than
the channel at the intended user. The presence of slow fading was shown to significantly
change the situation, since it allows the transmitter to employ a variable-rate transmission,
thus achieving secrecy even when the eavesdropper’s channel is better than the intended
receiver’s channel on average [7]. Also the use of multiple antennas can enhance the secrecy
capability, because it enables the transmitter to beamform in a direction as orthogonal to the
eavesdropper and as close to the intended user as possible [8–10]. Even when the channel at
the eavesdropper is unknown by the transmitter, artificial noise can be transmitted to degrade
the eavesdropper’s channel and thus reduce its signal-to-noise ratio, while being harmless to
the intended receiver [11–13].
More recently, physical layer security has also been extended to multiuser MIMO channels.
In this chapter, we will survey the research in the field of physical layer security for multiuser
MIMO communications, especially focusing on the case when multiple malicious users
are present in the network, and they can eavesdrop on each other. For these complex
scenarios, we will present some suboptimal low-complexity transmission schemes, discuss
their performance and quantify the sum-rate penalties imposed by the secrecy requirements
and by the presence of multiple users. We will discuss the challenges that arise in networks
with a large number of malicious receivers, we will identify potential ways to deal with these
challenges, and present an outlook on future directions for research.
2. Physical layer security in multiuser MIMO systems
One way to extend the concept of physical layer security to multiuser systems is by
considering the multiuser wiretap channel, where a transmitter wants to have confidential
communication with an arbitrary number of trusted users in the presence of an external
eavesdropper. For this system set-up, the secrecy capacity region in the presence of an
arbitrary number of legitimate receivers was characterized in [14], by using the relationship
between the minimum-mean-square-error and the mutual information. The capacity
achieving coding scheme was shown to be a variant of dirty-paper coding with Gaussian
signals.
Since the transmitter cannot always predict the behavior of the users, the multiuser MIMO
channel with malicious users is now regarded with large interest. This is also denoted
as the broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC). Consider a broadcast channel
with two independent confidential messages sent to two receivers, where each receiver acts
as an eavesdropper for the other one. In other words, the first message is intended for
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the first receiver but needs to be kept secret from the second receiver, and viceversa. This
scenario was studied in [15] for the multiple-input single-output (MISO) Gaussian case and
in [16] for general MIMO Gaussian case. In this case it was shown that both confidential
messages can be simultaneously transmitted at their respective maximum secrecy rates, and
the achievability was obtained using the dirty-paper coding.
Let us cosider now a larger multiuser network with more than two malicious users. For this
network, it is required that the base station (BS) securely transmits each confidential message,
ensuring that none of the other unintended users receive any information. Since in general
the behavior of the users cannot be determined by the transmitter, a conservative worst-case
scenario can be assumed for each user, where all the remaining users can cooperate to
jointly eavesdrop. In this case, for each user, the alliance of the cooperating eavesdropper
is equivalent to a single multi-antenna eavesdropper.
The MISO BCC with a generic number of malicious receivers was studied in [17, 18], and
it consists of a BS with M antennas that simultaneously transmit independent confidential
messages to K spatially dispersed single-antenna users, which can cooperate and eavesdrop
on each other. Although determining the secrecy capacity region for the generic MISO BCC
is still an open problem, suboptimal transmission schemes have been proposed to achieve
high secrecy sum-rates by controlling the amount of crosstalk between the users [19]. These
schemes are based on linear precoding, and unlike dirty-paper coding, their low complexity
makes them suitable for practical implementation. In the following sections, we present some
new results on the secrecy sum-rates achieved by multiuser MIMO linear precoding.
3. Physical layer security with multi-user MIMO linear precoding
Although suboptimal, linear precoding schemes are of particular interest because of their
low-complexity implementations and because they can control the amount of crosstalk
between the users to maintain a high sum-rate in the broadcast channel [20–27]. In the
MISO BCC, linear precoding can be employed to control the amount of interference and
information leakage to the unintended receivers introduced by the transmission of each
confidential message [17–19].
Let the transmitted signal be denoted by x, then the received signal is given by
y = Hx + n (1)
where H = [h1, . . . ,hK ] is the K × M channel matrix, hk is the k-th column of H and
it represents the channel between the BS and the k-th user, and n is complex Gaussian
noise. In linear precoding, the transmitted vector x is derived from the vector containing
the confidential messages u = [u1, . . . , uK ]
T through a deterministic linear transformation
(precoding) [22–25]. Let W = [w1, . . . ,wK ] be the M × K precoding matrix, where wk is the
k-th column of W. Then the transmitted signal is
x = Wu =
K
∑
k=1
wkuk. (2)
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3.1. Achievable secrecy sum-rates with linear precoding
The secrecy sum-rates achievable by linear precoding were obtained in [18] by considering
the worst-case scenario, where for each intended receiver k the remaining K − 1 users
can form an alliance k˜, and cooperate to jointly eavesdrop on the message uk. By
noting that each user k, along with its own eavesdropper k˜ and the transmitter, forms an
equivalent multi-input, single-output, multi-eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap channel [10],
an achievable secrecy sum-rate Rs is given by
Rs =
K
∑
k=1
max
{
log2
(
1 + SINRk
)
− log2
(
1 + SINR
k˜
)
, 0
}
, (3)
where SINRk and SINRk˜ are the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios for the message uk at
the intended receiver k and the eavesdropper k˜, respectively, given by
SINRk =
ρ
∣∣hHk wk∣∣2
1 + ρ ∑j 6=k
∣∣∣hHk wj
∣∣∣2
(4)
and
SINR
k˜
= ρ ‖Hkwk‖2 , (5)
and where ρ is the transmit SNR, and Hk is the matrix obtained from H by removing the k-th
row.
Particular attention was given to the Regularized Channel Inversion (RCI) precoder, because
it achieves better performance than the plain Channel Inversion precoder, especially at low
SNR [24, 25]. A linear precoder based on RCI was proposed for the MISO BCC in [19]. The
RCI precoding matrix is given by
W =
1√
γ
HH
(
HHH + MξIK
)−1
, (6)
where γ is a long-term power normalization constant, given by
γ = tr
{
HHH(HHH + MξIM)
−2
}
. (7)
For each message, the function of the regularization parameter ξ is to achieve a tradeoff
between maximizing the signal power at the intended user and minimizing the interference
and information leakage at the other unintended users. In [19], the regularization parameter
is optimized to maximize the secrecy sum-rate.
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3.2. Large-system results
The secrecy sum-rate achievable by the RCI precoder in the MISO BCC was obtained in
[19] by large-system analysis, where both the number of receivers K and the number of
transmit antennas M approach infinity, with their ratio β = K/M being held constant. Unless
otherwise stated, the results presented in the following refer to the large-system regime. We
note that these results are accurate even when applied to small systems with a finite number
of users.
An expression for the secrecy sum-rate R◦s in the large-system regime is given by [19]
R◦s = max

K log2
1+ g (β, ξ)
ρ+ ρξβ [1+g(β,ξ)]
2
ρ+[1+g(β,ξ)]2
1+
ρ
(1+g(β,ξ))2
, 0

 (8)
with
g (β, ξ) =
1
2

sgn(ξ) ·
√
(1− β)2
ξ2
+
2 (1+ β)
ξ
+ 1+
1− β
ξ
− 1

 . (9)
In [19], a closed form expression was also derived for the optimal regularization parameter
ξ⋆◦, given by
ξ⋆◦ =
−2ρ2 (1− β)2 + 6ρβ + 2β2 − 2 [β (ρ + 1)− ρ] ·
√
β2 [ρ2 + ρ + 1]− β [2ρ (ρ − 1)] + ρ2
6ρ2 (β + 2) + 6ρβ
.
(10)
For the specific case β = 1, i.e. M = K, the value of ξ⋆◦ reduces to [18]
ξ⋆◦ =
1
3ρ + 1+
√
3ρ + 1
, for β = 1. (11)
We note that the value of the regularization parameter ξ⋆◦ that maximizes the secrecy
sum-rate differs from the value ξ⋆◦ns = β/ρ that maximizes the sum-rate without secrecy
requirements [28].
By substituting the optimal value of the regularization parameter (10) in (8), it is possible
to obtain the optimal secrecy sum-rate R⋆◦s achievable by RCI precoding in the large-system
regime. The secrecy sum-rate R⋆◦s is a function of K, β and ρ. When β = 1, the optimal
secrecy sum-rate R⋆◦s has a simple expression, given by
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R
⋆◦
s = K log2
9ρ + 2+ (6ρ + 2)
√
3ρ + 1
4 (4ρ + 1)
, for β = 1. (12)
Although the optimal value of the regularization parameter ξ⋆◦ in (10) was derived in [19]
in the large-system regime, using ξ⋆◦ in a finite-size system does not cause a significant loss
in the secrecy sum-rate compared to using a regularization parameter ξfs(H) optimized for
every channel realization.
Fig. 1 shows the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of the normalized
secrecy sum-rate difference between using ξ⋆◦ and ξfs(H) as the regularization parameter of
the RCI precoder for K = 4, 8, 16, 32 users, for β = 1 and at an SNR of 10dB. The difference is
normalized by dividing by the secrecy sum-rate of the precoder that uses ξfs(H). We observe
that the average normalized secrecy sum-rate difference is less than 2.4 percent for all values
of K. As a result, the large-system regularization parameter ξ⋆◦ may be used instead of the
finite-system regularization parameter with only a small loss of performance. Moreover, the
value of ξ⋆◦ does not need to be calculated for each channel realization.
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Figure 1. Complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of the normalized secrecy sum-rate difference between using
ξfs(H) and ξ
⋆◦, with β = 1 and ρ = 10dB.
Fig. 2 compares the secrecy sum-rate R⋆◦s of the RCI precoder from the large-system analysis
to the simulated ergodic secrecy sum-rate Rs with a finite number of users, for different
values of β. We observe that as M increases, the simulated rates approach the curves from
large-system analysis. For β ≤ 1, R⋆◦s is always positive and monotonically increasing with
the SNR ρ. However when β > 1, the secrecy sum-rate does not monotonically increase
with ρ. There is an optimal value of the SNR beyond which the achievable secrecy sum-rate
R
⋆◦
s starts decreasing, until it becomes zero for large SNR. When β ≥ 2 no positive secrecy
sum-rate is achievable at all [19].
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Figure 2. Comparison between the secrecy sum-rate with RCI precoding in the large-system regime (8) and the simulated
ergodic secrecy sum-rate for finite M. Three sets of curves are shown, each one corresponds to a different value of β.
The expression of the secrecy sum-rate R⋆◦s becomes simpler in the limit of large SNR. In
fact, it can be approximated by
R
⋆◦
s ≈


K log2
1−β
β + K log2 ρ for β < 1
K
2 log2
27
64 +
K
2 log2 ρ for β = 1
max
{
3K log2
β
β−1 − K log2 ρ, 0
}
for β > 1
, as ρ → ∞. (13)
We note from (13) that for high SNR, the behavior of the secrecy sum-rate significanly
depends on the ratio β between the number of users K and the number of transmit antennas
M. When K < M, the secrecy sum-rate scales linearly with the factor K. If K = M, the scaling
factor reduces to K/2. When the number of users K exceeds the number of antennas M, then
the secrecy sum-rate decreases with the SNR ρ, and there is a value of ρ beyond which the
achievable secrecy sum-rate becomes zero.
3.3. Effect of the network load
Fig. 3 depicts the asymptotic secrecy sum-rate per transmit antenna as a function of β, for
several values of the SNR. We denote by βopt the value of the ratio β that maximizes the
secrecy sum-rate per transmit antenna R⋆◦s /M. It is possible to see from Fig. 3 that βopt is an
increasing function of the SNR. The value of βopt falls between 0 and 1, and it tends to 1 in
the limit of large SNR.
We denote by βmax the maximum value of β allowed for non-zero secrecy sum-rates. The
value of βmax represents the maximum number of users per transmit antenna that can be
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served with non-zero secrecy sum-rate. Fig. 3 shows that βmax is a decreasing function of
the SNR. The value of βmax can be found by solving the following cubic equation [19]
(ρ + 1) β3max − (3ρ + 2) β
2
max + 3ρβmax − ρ = 0. (14)
The value of βmax falls between 1 and 2. This means that if K ≥ 2M, i.e. if β ≥ 2, then the
secrecy sum-rate is zero for all SNRs. In the limit of large SNR, equation (14) reduces to
(βmax − 1)
3 = 0, (15)
yielding to βmax = 1. These results can be explained as follows. In the worst-case scenario,
the alliance of cooperating eavesdroppers can cancel the interference, and its received SINR
is the ratio between the signal leakage and the thermal noise. In the limit of large SNR, the
thermal noise vanishes, and the only means for the transmitter to limit the eavesdropper’s
SINR is by reducing the signal leakage to zero by inverting the channel matrix. This can
only be accomplished when the number of transmit antennas is larger than or equal to the
number of users, hence only if β ≤ 1. When β > 1 this is not possible, and no positive
secrecy sum-rate can be achieved. When β ≥ 2, the eavesdroppers are able to drive the
secrecy sum-rate to zero irrespective of ρ. This is consistent with the results presented in [10]
for a single-user system.
4. The cost of physical layer security in multi-user MIMO
Guaranteeing secrecy and serving multiple (and potentially malicious) users at the same time
both come at a cost in terms of the per-user transmission rate. In this section, we discuss the
cost of achieving physical layer security in multiuser MIMO communications.
4.1. Secrecy loss
The cost due to the secrecy requirements, which we denote by secrecy loss, can be obtained
by comparing the secrecy sum-rate R⋆◦s achieved by the RCI precoder to the sum-rate R
⋆◦
achieved by an optimized RCI precoder without secrecy requirements. The gap between R⋆◦s
and R⋆◦ represents how much guaranteeing secrecy costs in terms of the achievable sum-rate.
The optimal sum-rate R⋆◦ without secrecy requirements is obtained by using the precoder in
(6), and it is given by [29]
R⋆◦ = K log2 [1 + g (β, ξ
⋆◦
ns )] , (16)
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Figure 3. Asymptotic secrecy sum-rate per transmit antenna with RCI as a function of β. Circles denote βopt, squares denote
βmax.
with ξ⋆◦ns = β/ρ. It is easy to show that R
⋆◦ ≥ 0 for all values of β and ρ, with equality
only for ρ = 0, and that R⋆◦ tends to zero as β → ∞. Hence, there is no limit to the
number of users per transmit antenna β that the system can accommodate with a non-zero
sum-rate. However if we impose the secrecy requirements, the secrecy sum-rate R⋆◦s is zero
for β ≥ βmax, with βmax given by (14). Therefore, introducing the secrecy requirements will
limit to βmax the number of users per transmit antenna that can be served with a non-zero
sum-rate.
We now compare the secrecy sum-rate R⋆◦s to the sum-rate R
⋆◦ in the limit of large SNR.
Again by using the regularization parameter ξ⋆◦ns = β/ρ we obtain the following large-SNR
approximation for the secrecy sum-rate without secrecy requirements [19]
R
⋆◦
≈


K log2
1−β
β + K log2 ρ for β < 1
K
2 log2 ρ for β = 1
K log2
β
β−1 for β > 1
, as ρ → ∞. (17)
By comparing (17) to (13), we can draw the following conclusions regarding the large-SNR
regime. If the number of transmit antennas M is larger than the number of users K, then
β < 1, R⋆◦s = R
⋆◦, and the secrecy requirements do not decrease the sum-rate of the
network. Therefore, by using ξ⋆◦ from (10) one can achieve secrecy while maintaining the
same sum-rate, i.e. there is no secrecy loss. If M = K, then β = 1, the secrecy requirements
only reduce the sum-rate by a constant value, and the scaling factor K/2 remains unchanged.
Alternatively, one can achieve secrecy while maintaining the same sum-rate, by increasing
the transmitted power by a factor 64/27 ≈ 3.75dB. If M < K, i.e. β > 1, then the secrecy
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requirements result in a value of R⋆◦s that decreases with the SNR, as opposed to a constant
sum-rate R⋆◦ without secrecy. Therefore if the SNR is too large, then the secrecy sum-rate
becomes zero.
4.2. Multiuser Loss
The cost due the interference caused by the presence of multiple users in the system, which
we denote by multiuser loss, is given by the gap between the per-user secrecy rate R⋆◦s /K and
the secrecy capacity Cs,SU of the single-user MISOME wiretap channel, where one user is
served at a time and the remaining users can eavesdrop.
The value of Cs,SU was obtained in [10], and for large SNR it can be approximated by
Cs,SU ≈


log2 ρ for β < 1
1
2 log2 ρ for β = 1
max
{
log2
1
(β−1)
, 0
}
for β > 1
, as ρ → ∞. (18)
We compare R⋆◦s /K to Cs,SU in the large-SNR regime. We note that in Cs,SU from [10]
a single-user system is considered. Therefore, only one message is transmitted to one
legitimate user, and the user does not experience any interference. By comparing (18) to
R⋆◦s /K, we can conclude that for β ≤ 1, the RCI precoder achieves a per-user secrecy rate
which has the same linear scaling factor as the secrecy capacity of a single-user system with
no interference. When 1 < β < 2, the presence of interference results in a value of R⋆◦s that
decreases with the SNR, as opposed to a constant value for Cs,SU. When β ≥ 2, the secrecy
rate is zero irrespective of the presence of interference.
4.3. Power allocation
In some cases, the rate loss generated by the secrecy requirements and by the interference
due to the presence of multiple users can be compensated by a power allocation scheme.
In [18], an iterative power allocation algorithm was proposed to obtain the maximum
secrecy sum-rate for a fixed regularization parameter ξ. The algorithm was also extended to
maximize the secrecy sum-rate by jointly optimizing the regularization parameter ξ and the
power allocation vector. However, in many cases there is a negligible performance difference
between the joint and the separate optimization. As a result, a low-complexity, near-optimal
RCI precoder may be implemented by using ξ⋆◦ from (10) and optimizing the power vector
separately [18].
The RCI precoder with optimal power allocation (RCI-PA) outperforms the RCI precoder
with equal power (RCI-EP), and the gain does not vanish at high SNR. The RCI-PA precoder
thus reduces the rate loss due to secrecy requirements and interference, and in some cases it
achieves a per-user rate which is as high as the rate achieved by the optimal RCI-EP precoder
without secrecy requirements, and as high as the secrecy capacity of a single-user system
[18].
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4.4. Numerical results
Fig. 4 compares the simulated ergodic sum-rates Rs and R of the RCI precoder with and
without secrecy requirements, respectively. These were obtained by using the regularization
parameters ξ⋆◦ and ξ⋆◦ns , respectively. For β < 1, the difference between R and Rs becomes
negligible at large SNR, and secrecy can be achieved without additional costs. For β = 1,
the two curves tend to have same slope at large SNR, but there is a residual gap between
them. Therefore, secrecy can be achieved at a lower sum-rate. We note that in order to
achieve secrecy without decreasing the sum-rate, the required additional power is less than
4dB at all SNRs. For β > 1, the sum-rate tends to saturate for large SNR, whereas the secrecy
sum-rate starts decreasing. If the SNR is too large, then the secrecy requirements force the
sum-rate to zero.
Fig. 4 also shows the simulated secrecy capacity Cs,SU of the MISOME wiretap channel. For
β ≤ 1, the RCI precoder achieves a per-user secrecy rate which has the same linear scaling
factor as Cs,SU. When 1 < β < 2, Cs,SU saturates at high SNR, while the secrecy sum-rate
decreases. All these numerical results confirm the ones obtained from the large-system
analysis.
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Figure 4. Comparison between the simulated ergodic per-user secrecy rate with RCI (solid) and the two upper bounds: (i)
per-user rate without secrecy requirements (dashed) and (ii) MISOME secrecy capacity (dotted), for K = 12 users. Three values
of β are considered: 0.8, 1, and 1.2, corresponding to M = 15, 12 and 10 antennas.
Fig. 5 shows the simulated per-user secrecy rate of the RCI-PA precoder from [18], with
optimal power allocation. This is compared to the RCI-EP precoder. Fig. 5 also shows
that the power allocation scheme reduces the sum-rate loss due to the secrecy requirements.
For ρ ≥ 15dB, RCI with power allocation achieves a per-user secrecy rate which is even
higher than the per-user rate achieved by the optimal RCI-EP without secrecy requirements.
Furthermore, Fig. 5 shows the simulated secrecy capacity Cs,SU of a MISOME channel with
the same per-message transmit power. Although Cs,SU is obtained in a single-user and
interference-free system [10], at high SNR, RCI with power allocation achieves a per-user
secrecy rate as large as Cs,SU.
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allocation (dashed). The rate of the optimal RCI precoder without secrecy requirements (squares) and the secrecy capacity of
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5. Current research on multiuser MIMO physical layer security
Before concluding this chapter, we briefly discuss current research topics on physical layer
security for multiuser MIMO communications, and we mention possible extensions of the
results presented.
5.1. Power reduction strategy
Since for β > 1 the RCI precoder performs poorly in the high-SNR regime, a linear
precoder based on RCI and power reduction could significantly increase the high-SNR
secrecy sum-rate. In fact, we can observe from Fig. 2 that when β > 1 there is an optimal
value of the SNR beyond which the achievable secrecy sum-rate R⋆◦s starts decreasing.
A power reduction strategy would prevent the secrecy sum-rate from decreasing at high SNR
by reducing the transmit power, and therefore reducing the SNR to the value that maximizes
the secrecy sum-rate. For 1 < β < 2 and large SNR, the RCI precoder with power reduction
would thus achieve a constant nonnegative secrecy sum-rate. However, this strategy would
not be effective for β ≥ 2, since in this case the secrecy sum-rate is zero irrespective of the
SNR.
5.2. Secrecy sum-rates in the presence of channel estimation error
In Sections 3 and 4, we discussed the secrecy rate performance of multi-user MIMO linear
precoding for the case when perfect channel state information (CSI) is available at the
transmitter. However, a more realistic scenario is the one where only an estimation of the
channel is available at the transmitter. The relation between the true channel H and the
estimated channel Hˆ is usually modeled as
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H = Hˆ + E (19)
where the matrix E represents the channel estimation error, and it is independent from Hˆ.
The knowledge of Hˆ is used by the transmitter to obtain the RCI precoding matrix. The
entries of Hˆ and E are i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and
variances 1− τ2 and τ2, respectively. The value of τ ∈ [0, 1] depends on the quality and
technique used for channel estimation. When τ = 0 the CSI is perfectly known, whereas
τ = 1 corresponds to the case when no CSI is available at all.
Future research could analyze the performance of linear precoding in the presence of
imperfect CSI, deriving the achievable secrecy sum-rate as a function of the channel
estimation error variance τ2. This would allow to study how the CSI estimation error must
scale with the SNR, in order to maintain a given high-SNR rate gap to the case with perfect
CSI, so that the multiplexing gain is not affected. More specifically, the case of frequency
division duplex (FDD) systems could be studied. Assuming that users quantize their channel
directions by using B bits and employing random vector quantization (RVQ), and that they
feed the quantization index back to the transmitter [30, 31], it would be interesting to
determine how many feedback bits are required by each user in order to maintain a constant
gap to the case with perfect CSI.
6. Conclusions
Throughout this chapter, we presented an up-to-date summary of the research in the field of
physical layer security for multiuser MIMO communications. Unlike classical cryptography,
physical layer security does not require key distribution and management, it does not rely
on the limited computational power of the eavesdroppers, and it does not employ complex
encryption algorithms. For these reasons, it is suitable for large dynamic wireless networks,
and it has been proposed to enhance the protection of confidential messages transmitted
over wireless channels. In this chapter, we especially focused on the problem of secret
communication in a multiuser MIMO system. We considered the general case where a
multiantenna base station transmits independent confidential messages to a generic number
of users. We assumed that the users can potentially act maliciously and eavesdrop on
each other. For this system set-up, we presented some transmission schemes based on
linear precoding. We discussed the performance of these schemes as well as the cost of
simultaneously guaranteeing secrecy to multiple users.
It has been recently shown that, in the large SNR regime, a linear precoding scheme based
on regularized channel inversion can achieve secrecy without reducing the sum-rate at no
additional cost when the number of transmit antennas M is larger than the number of users
K. If K = M, secrecy can be achieved with a small rate loss or, alternatively, without reducing
the sum-rate at a cost of less than 4dB in terms of the power transmitted. However, the
secrecy requirements limit the maximum number of users that can be served with a non-zero
rate. When K > M, there is an optimal value of the SNR beyond which the achievable rate
starts decreasing, and at large SNR the secrecy sum-rate achievable by RCI precoding is poor.
The base station could prevent the secrecy sum-rate from decreasing by reducing the transmit
power, and therefore the SNR, to the value that maximizes the secrecy sum-rate. This would
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result in a constant nonnegative high-SNR secrecy sum-rate. However, this strategy would
not be effective if K ≥ 2M.
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